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As this essay is written many individuals believed to have 
adhered to the cause of terrorist activities against the United 
States, including participation in or support of the September 
11,2001 attacks in New York and at the Pentagon building, are 
in U.S. military custody. Maintained by the U.S. Marine Corps, 
the conditions of a detention camp in Cuba attract regular news 
coverage. Some such persons are detained elsewhere. In a pro- 
claimed war against terrorism, one that by definition cannot 
end with either an armistice or the conventional peace treaty of 
yesteryear, it is inevitable that more persons will surrender to 
the U.S. or be seized during military operations in other coun- 
tries. This is a war not only without a light at the end of the 
tunnel but no clear roadmap as to future battlefields. 
While most detainees are unquestionably of foreign nation- 
ality, the emergence of at least two alleged American-citizen 
- - pp 
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members of the terrorist group presumably responsible for the 
September 11 attacks complicates already muddy legal waters. 
How such persons, when taken on foreign soil, are classi- 
fied is not simply a matter of nomenclature. Their treatment 
may wholly or largely be determined by whether they are 
viewed and defined as international criminals, as are, for exam- 
ple, pirates or whether they are accorded the status of Prisoners 
of War (POW) under either an existing international compact or 
through some modified interpretation of prevailing 
 agreement^.^ 
This essay allows the writer to enter a fluid fray being 
played out almost day-by-day in the media and, of course, where 
it counts: in the administration of President George W. Bush. 
Conscious of the ebbs and drifts of both the current debates and 
desperately anxious not to be preempted by the march of a 
swiftly moving time frame, this essay suggests an approach to 
U.S. integration of generally accepted rules for the treatment of 
POWs that will advance both the war on terrorism and 
America's need to  embrace the reality of the globalization of hu- 
manistic mores and notions about justice without surrendering 
our ~overeignty.~ 
The issue as to whether to  classify detained "fightersn3 as 
POWs or as some form of international criminal deserving no 
1 ' h e  most significant international accord for the protection of prisoners of 
war is, of course, the Geneva Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3316, TIAS No. 3364, 75 
UNTS 135, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/y3gctpw.htm. 
An indispensable source of documents relating to the laws of war is maintained on 
the Web a t  The Avalon Project a t  the Yale Law School, The Laws of War at http:// 
www.yale.eddlawweb/avalonJlawofwarAawwar.htm. 
2 There is no real way to avoid using the term "war" when referring to the 
campaign against terrorism. That the word has been expanded in post-modernist 
speech to embrace everything from political efforts to alleviate poverty to preserv- 
ing the environment to ensuring that "no child is left behind" is actually very rele- 
vant to the arguments made in this essay. 
3 "Fighters" seems to be a generally accepted normative term for those cap- 
tured in Afghanistan, Israel, the Gaza Strip or wherever. Whatever else such per- 
sons may be, they have been engaged in fighting or, a t  the least, are alleged to 
have been so engaged. During March and April 2002, the term "gunmen" has been 
increasingly applied to armed Palestinians encountered by Israeli military forces 
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protection from standards especially formulated to shield con- 
ventional combatants from dangers and harms generally abhor- 
rent to Western political and military dogma is a pressing one. 
Fighters for the purpose of this essay are defined as individuals 
under arms in an organization that is not a national military 
force but have some significant attributes of traditional military 
components. These may include being organized into units, hav- 
ing a rank structure, responding to a command system, training 
in a coherent organizational manner and other aspects of con- 
ventional military identity. Such persons are in support of a 
military and political goal and are engaged in combat against 
the government of a nation or against other nations who are 
viewed as hostile to their political agenda. To be considered as 
POWs entitled to the protections afforded by international law, 
their capture must take place in a country other than that of 
the capturing power.* 
Without understanding the nature of warfare in the early, 
modern and continuing post-modern eras, including the shifting 
meaning of the profession of arms, analyzing the status of 
Taliban and A1 Qaeda detainees will be incomplete, indeed fun- 
damentally misleading.5 
"Artillery lends dignity to what otherwise would be a com- 
mon brawl." The author was a young Army officer going 
through training as a Counterintelligence Officer and Special 
Agent at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, then located a t  Fort 
Holabird, in Baltimore, Maryland in early 1965. Desiring that 
its intelligence officers understand the history and nature of 
other branches, part of the course consisted of short orientation 
during their continuing incursions into the territory of Yasser Arafat. Treatment 
of captured "gunmen" does not appear to be in accordance with the Geneva Con- 
vention as  they are not recognized as  members of a nation state's military. Even 
the term "gunmen" reflects an  attempt to separate this cohort from the world of 
soldiers entitled to customary legal protections. 
4 The language and tenor of the Geneva Convention, and predecessors in- 
cluding the American Lieber Code, presume that legal duties of care for captured 
enemy combatants (and protection of non-combatants) arises in the context of a 
war with a nation state. The key exception in American history was the Civil War 
where pragmatic and overwhelming reality dictated that de facto status be ac- 
corded to the Confederate States of America forces encountered in the field. 
5 Two indispensable starting points for all researchers, to which I am much 
indebted, are CHRISTOPHER COKER, TERRORISM AND CML STRIFE (John Pimlott ed., 
1987) and CHRISTOPHER COKER, WAR AND THE ILLIBERAL CONSCIENCE (1998). 
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lectures about every other arm of the service. The quotation 
heading this paragraph was a t  the top of a projected slide that 
occupied an entire screen. The picture showed characters out of 
the age of castles walloping each other with an odd assortment 
of comical hand weapons including oversized spears and rather 
large rocks. It was a brawl writ large. 
Undercutting the humor of the slide was the very serious 
lecture by an artillery officer whose purpose was not simply to 
tell us about his branch but to make us understand that artil- 
lery brought a sort of humanistic warriorhood to land combat. 
In that sense, he was both part of and an extension of an 
evolved Western concept of warfare and the warrior that must 
be re-examined in the post-modern context of military engage- 
ments against forces described as terroristic. 
The Western tradition of warfare glorifies virtues seldom 
found in combat but sought through adoption first of codes of 
conduct and later through domestic and international law. The 
very notions of both chivalry and the theologically imbued phi- 
losophy of Just War support the dual concepts of personal enno- 
blement and achieving that status through the avoidance of 
unnecessary imposition of harm on non-combatants and cap- 
tured enemies. That the exception has always been more of the 
rule, that the warrior class has constantly had to redefine itself 
and explain incremental departures from earlier practices, is 
the reality. Curbing excessive violence through codes of con- 
duct6 has clashed consistently with technological development, 
the increased scale of warfare, barbarism born of rampant na- 
tionalism and ethnic centrality in conflicts, and vastly wider 
theaters of military and naval  operation^.^ 
6 See, e.g., The Law of Land Warfare, in THE UNITED STATE ARMY FIELD MAN- 
UAL, available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/fieldman. 
html 
7 Warfare has gone through technologically mediated phases in the past two 
hundred years. Combat of rather brief duration yielded to extensive and prolonged 
operations with significant and often fatal impact on civilian populations. The 
rapid abandonment of what were believed to be accepted concepts of limited aerial 
warfare early in World War I1 led to the carpet bombing (a very accurate term) of 
cities in England, Europe and Japan. The current emphasis on Precision Guided 
Munitions is part wise operational tactics and part sound public relations. The 
Western world in general, the United States in particular, takes scant comfort in 
military operations tha t  bring about substantial "collateral damage," the loss of 
civilians as opposed to combatants. John Keegan has best discussed the evolving 
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In Western culture where military and naval valor were 
respected in societies that sometimes were relatively inclusive 
of military professionals and those that regarded them as neces- 
sary evils, self-definition of the warrior class was unavoidable, 
indeed indispensable.8 
The professional soldiers of today's Western armed services 
are in a complex, evolving departure from hisker forbears.9 
The Western attitude toward great violence has changed radi- 
cally since World War I1 for a host of reasons. The enormity of 
worldwide suffering in the Second World War triggered an  
ongoing revulsive factor toward such combat not wholly based 
simply on fear of its possible repetition. The recognition that 
'?lot wars" can end in stalemates, as in Korea1° or that the un- 
thinkable - that the U.S. might lose a war - actually happened; 
Vietnam, tempered sentiment that previously supported an  
aroused warrior mentality that supported the professionals 
leading, largely, the amateurs. 
Several key factors have led to a general post-modern con- 
sensus disfavoring broad (geographical) and lengthy military 
campaigns.ll Post-modern society exhibits little of the patience 
associated with past generations. Familiarity with military and 
Western abhorrence of broad and lasting infliction of casualties in  a number of his 
books, especially JOHN KEEGAN, THE FACE OF BATTLE (1977). The writings of 
Archer Jones also illuminate the changing nature of Western warfare. 
8 Influencing today's events is the long American dilemma of the role of the 
professional military vis-a-vis the volunteer soldier. A part of American constitu- 
tional law and political history, the generalized belief in and dependence on volun- 
teers (and later conscriptees) serving under a needed but often spurned 
professional cadre is in some degree of conflict with the contemporary all-volunteer 
Armed Forces. 
9 The mere reality of the feminization of most contemporary military forces is 
beyond the scope of this discussion but is not irrelevant. Rapidly fading is the 
exclusive masculinity of the military, in  itself largely a source of didactic values 
concerning the definition of who a warrior is and how he regards his foes, faced on 
the fields or captured. 
10 See BEVIN ALEXANDER, KOREA, THE FIRST WAR WE LOST (1986). The politi- 
cal fallout from the American policy to settle for an  armistice rather than strive for 
a comprehensive military victory, ended President Truman's hopes for a second 
full term and shifted U.S. foreign and domestic policy dramatically. 
l1 As indicated previously, the citizens of most Western nations recoil from 
the possibility of lengthy and costly military engagements. Whether technology 
has oversold itself or there are unrealistic expectations of modern ordnance, the 
fact remains that  Americans, in particular, expect that the nation's military opera- 
tions will be short and as  bloodless as possible (that is, with regard to U.S. 
casualties). 
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naval options and operations comes through an ever present 
media that, beginning in the Vietnam conflict, brought war into 
America's (and other country's) living rooms; and in color. With 
it came the increased momentum of a generalized rejection of 
widespread imposition of violence affecting civilian 
populations. l2 
While treatment of POWs and indiscriminate or deliberate 
infliction of widespread civilian casualties may be separate is- 
sues for both international law and military science, the West- 
ern populace as a whole does not make such distinctions. With 
regard to  POWs, American prisoners, horror became the central 
reaction as news of Japanese maltreatment and torture of our 
personnel in World War I1 became common knowledge.13 The 
horrific maltreatment of both captured military personnel (Al- 
lied as well as American) and civilian internees was a major 
part of the prosecution of Japanese war crimes at both the In- 
ternational Military Tribunal for the Far East and local trials in 
areas that had been Japanese-occupied.14 Death penalties for 
killing prisoners and internees and being responsible for the 
acts of subordinates were handed down in quite a few cases.15 
A second, sensitizing experience for Americans (and also to 
a lesser degree for other Westerners) was the shock of discover- 
ing during and after the Korean conflict that POWs were sub- 
12 Whether is was the bombing of Dresden, its horror expressed most widely 
through KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE F m  or an  introspective, part fear- 
based, part-humanitarian reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American popular 
opinion favors achieving stated objectives with minimal force largely expended on 
clearly military targets. The mistaken targeting of a handful of people is front- 
page news with now expected negative reactions having serious political 
implications. 
13 The German record was, overall, better but nonetheless there were signifi- 
cant departures from international law. The German treatment of captured Rus- 
sians was wholly and by direct order of Adolf Hitler in abject disregard not only of 
controlling international law but of several centuries of evolved rules of military 
behavior. See BEVIN ALEXANDER, HOW HITLER COULD HAVE WON WORLD WAR I1 
(2001). 
14 See generally International Military Tribunal for the Far East at http:// 
www.yale.ed~awweb/avalon/imtfem.htm; see also Stephen's Study Room: British 
Military & Criminal History in the Period of 1900-1999 at http://www.stephen- 
stratford.co.uWimtfe.htm. 
15 See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001) available at http:// 
www.bartleby.com/65/wa/warcrime.html. The postwar trials of Japanese generals 
Homma and Yamashita, after which they were executed, remain both troubling 
and controversial. 
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jected not merely to illegal physical maltreatment but also 
excruciatingly sophisticated and persistent psychological condi- 
tioning, so-called "brainwashing."l6 That a handful of Ameri- 
can POWs could be conditioned to  renounce their country and 
accuse the U.S. of committing bizarre criminal acts forbidden by 
international law (in particular, waging biological warfare) not 
only astounded many, but also thoroughly frightened them. 
Not even the Germans had tried that approach. The national 
reaction was to further support and insist upon the application 
of international law insofar as it forbade maltreatment of 
POWs.17 The Vietnam experience, in which captured Ameri- 
cans, mostly Navy and Air Force officers of higher education 
than their Korean War POW predecessors, occasionally suc- 
cumbed to psychological manipulation reinforced a belief in the 
right of POWs to be protected.18 
The main problem is that most Americans then, and per- 
haps now, define war in ways that may be largely irrelevant to 
post-modern society. In American historical thought and expe- 
rience, true war invoking evolved international and domestic 
rules of humane treatment of prisoners was defined as hostili- 
ties between powers having a Western form of government. 
This approach was largely the successor in interest to  the Brit- 
ish doctrine, hardly hidden, that the rules of warfare were only 
to be extended to the combatants of civilized nations. Thus, re- 
straints on British military conduct during colonial wars were 
limited by the values and orders of field commanders, not be- 
cause of subordination to international or military law. Ameri- 
can political and military practice followed that of Great 
Britain. lg 
16 See American Defense Institute, The Captain's Chair (1997) at http:// 
www.ojc.org/adi/ccwinter.htm. 
17 See id. 
18 See Memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington D.C., 
Office of the Director, for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (May 10, 1971) at  http://nation- 
alalliance.org/tanO l.htm. 
19 Whether it was the future Duke of Wellington's campaign against the 
Mahrattas in India or U.S. forces fighting the Indians, no concept of warfare ac- 
cording to the Western warriors code ever existed. Captured adversaries may or 
may not be humanely treated according to the whims of the field commander or the 
policies of the day. Neither was ever predictable or consistent. 
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In order to posit a theory as to how captured fighters who 
adhere to a cause, rather than directly and traditionally serving 
a nation state, ought to be treated today, a brief review of the 
shifting nature of Western concepts about warfare and its prac- 
tice is necessary. 
Whatever the clear language of the U.S. Constitution as to 
war-making authority, the reality is that the U.S. has only de- 
clared war four times in its long history of military and naval 
combat.20 In the period following world War 11, strategic politi- 
cal and military concerns militated against declarations of war 
in Korea, Vietnam and, latterly, the conflict against Iraq and 
the continuing operations in Afghanistan. Declaring war has 
too many domestic and international ramifications, it is, simply, 
not the way to go anymore. Without any alteration of interna- 
tional law, Western nations have embraced the concept of lim- 
ited war with stated objectives t o  be carried out by armed forces 
charged, at their peril, with minimizing harm to non-combat- 
ants and their property and also required to conclude hostilities 
successfully within the shortest time possible. 
The Western watchword is to conduct "humane warfare" 
with little serious public analysis by a technology-sotted popula- 
tion as to the possible oxymoron nature of such a concept.21 
Thus two somewhat contradictory paths are followed. War is 
waged with minimal adherence to historic formalities that force 
a sharp focus on government policies and aims and when forces 
are engaged they are expected, indeed required, to fight the 
most narrow and bloodless campaigns technology and command 
oversight will permit. General "Unconditional Surrender" 
Grant, neither as military commander nor as commander-in- 
20 The four declared wars are the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War 
and the two World Wars. 
21 Perhaps the clearest manifestation of that concept is the public's demand 
for and belief in the utility and effectiveness of a wide range of Precision Guided 
Munitions ranging from "Smart Bombsn to non-lethal ordinance. That the success 
rate of Precision Guided Munitions claimed in the Gulf War and now revealing 
warts as after action analysis of their employment in Afghanistan indicates it is 
less than both claimed and desired seems beyond the point for most people. With- 
out doubt, losses to civilian populations have been significantly avoided by the use 
of very expensive "smart" weapons. 
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chief, would recognize the doctrinal terrain of post-modern 
America (and that of other major Western 
IV. THE PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR 
In classical times, captured soldiers and sailors often faced 
lifelong enslavement with their actuarial longevity being some- 
what shorL23 If they were lucky they might be slain shortly af- 
ter capture. The practice of ransoming captives, familiar from 
the legend and lore of the Middle Ages, only occurred when a 
personage of worth might be redeemed for familial reasons, po- 
litical reasons,24 or both.25 
Codes of chivalry dictated that those of knightly rank treat 
opponents of the same grade with if not kindness at least not 
with naked brutality.26 A Western tradition of treating at least 
some captives according to  contemporary rules of leniency 
slowly developed. 
The emergence of a professional military caste in substitution 
for the feudal leadership that combined political and military 
duties with scant separation between the two reflected the be- 
ginnings of the modern state. In England the rule of the regi- 
cide, Oliver Cromwell marks the inauguration of a true 
professional military class.27 
By the time of the American Revolution, European codes of 
conduct with regard to POWs were sufficiently developed as to 
22 In  print after more than a century, General Grant's "Memoirs," available in 
a number of editions, reflect his strategic view of warfare, one that dominated 
American thinking until the Korean War. See, e.g., Personal Memoirs: Ulysses S. 
Grant, WAR TIMES J .  a t  http://wtj.com/archives/grantJ. 
23 See, e.g., Avignon & Provence, at http://www.avignon-et-provence.com/avi- 
gnon/histoire/gb/hist3.htm 
24 See id. See also Yvonne Friedman, Encounter Between Enemies, at http:// 
www.brill.nl/catalogue/productinfo.asp?product=9103. 
25 While ransom was sometimes a feature of Japanese and Chinese feudal 
warfare, the practice never became as  common as  in the West. 
26 See Brian R. Price, A Code of Chivalry at http://www.chronique.com/li- 
brary/Chivalry/code.htm. 
27 Not coincidentally, the beginnings of a professional officer class in  Crom- 
well's New Model Avenue was accompanied by the forming of the first permanent 
English regiments in a form which remains largely unchanged to the present. This 
development, followed by other European powers, fostered the development of the 
professional warrior class with its own traditions, uniforms (much later), distinc- 
tive and important symbols of service and authority (decorations and insignia) and 
system of laws and codes of conduct. 
Heinonline - -  14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 141 2002 
142 PACE INT'L L. REV. Wol. 14:133 
allow serious challenge to British treatment of captured rebel- 
lious colonists.28 Following a then almost universal tradition, 
people in armed rebellion were considered to be outside the law 
of nations and the codes of military conduct and could be, and 
often were, killed as traitors.29 
British treatment of captured Continental Army personnel 
was exceedingly harsh and insured a commensurate surfeit of 
outrage. Retaliation by the Continental Army was generally 
isolated. As a matter of policy, prisoners were often reasonably 
well protected from abuse.30 
Pre-modern European armies rarely had the resources to 
maintain large numbers of POWs and were restrained by codes 
of conduct from killing them. A legal process from an earlier 
time, parole, became a dominant means to both neutralize 
POWs without straining a belligerent's res0urces.3~ A paroled 
prisoner swore not to engage in any hostilities against the cap- 
turing power until exchanged for a similar prisoner held by his 
~ i d e . 3 ~  While the literature of the era often talks about high- 
ranking paroled officers enjoying, as it were, a liberal and 
- - - 
28 The famed and dreaded Prison Ships in New York harbor violated contem- 
porary norms for housing prisoners of war but not for traitors, a fine legal point 
maintained by the British but attracting little understanding from their foes. 
Brooklyn's Fort Green park has a large monument, a pillar, memorializing the 
thousands who died in inhumane, even by the standards of the time, conditions 
about the Prison Ships. See generally HAMILTON FISH,  LL.D., NEW YORK STATE - 
THE BATTLEGROUND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR (Vintage Press 1976) available at 
http://www.longislandgenealogy.com/prison.html. 
29 There are many online documents dealing with the treatment of prisoners 
during the American Revolution. See, e.g., Virtual Marching Tour of the American 
Revolution, The Philadelphia Campaign 1777 at http://www.ushistory.org/march/ 
phila/whitemarsh-3.htm. In Brooklyn's Fort Greene Park, a tall, slender monu- 
ment attests to the Continental soldiers (and some hapless and uninvolved folks) 
who suffered and died on British prisoner hulks in the Hudson River. 
30 In any event, the often retreating and under-supplied Continental Army 
had little ability to maintain significant bodies of captured enemy. Given the fluid- 
ity of the war zones establishing camps for prisoners was impossible. Thus, parole 
played a very important part in the Revolutionary War. The British, of course, 
rarely reciprocated as  they viewed all captured combatants as, at least in the least 
sense, rebellious subjects not entitled to the courtesies of warfare. See generally 
The George Washington Papers a t  the Library of Congress, Time Line: The Ameri- 
can Revolution at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml~l776.html. 
31 See generally, Richard Seltzer, The Rise, Progress, and Termination of the 
American Revolution Interspersed with biographical, Political, and Moral Observa- 
tion (18051, available at http://www.samizdat.com/warren/rev2l.html. 
32 See id. 
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friendly quasi-leave among the enemy, in reality parole became 
the system for transforming, at least temporarily low-ranking 
enemy soldiers into a harmless and largely unsupervised 
cohort. 
The American Civil War created an unprecedented chal- 
lenge to  the issue of limiting war through law and, of immediate 
relevance, the treatment of personnel captured or who surren- 
dered. While the Southern rebellion can be analyzed, legally 
and technically, as a criminal conspiracy from start to finish, 
the form and organization of the Confederate government and 
the forces raised under its flag mirrored almost exactly the Fed- 
eral government and less exactly but significantly that of Euro- 
pean governments. In no way could the Lincoln administration 
recognize the Southern government as a de jure entity. To do so 
would be to undermine any Constitutional theory of the insepa- 
rability of the Federal Union.33 
On the other hand, meeting Confederate forces in the field 
and recognizing that each side would inevitably take prisoners 
and accept surrenders forced a rational accommodation be- 
tween the demands of Constitutional law and theory and the 
realities of what was a major ~ a r . 3 ~  
Into the breach came Francis Lieber and his code of war- 
fare, the first thorough American codification of discreet laws 
and regulations previously scattered throughout federal law.35 
The Lieber Code encapsulated both formalized and generally 
accepted rules of Western law and practice for the treatment of 
POWs while also addressing special aspects of the then raging 
Civil War including the treatment of slaves encountered or 
taken into custody. At a time when military orders resisted 
easy reading and obtuse language permeated legal writing, the 
Lieber Code was remarkably clear. It was intended to be under- 
stood by Union officers of all ranks and not solely by staff judge 
advocates. 
33 The literature on the claimed right to secede is vast and ever growing and is 
not relevant to this article. My view of Southern constitutional theory may be 
found in my article, Ralph M. Stein, The South Won't Rise Over Again but it's Time 
to Study the Defunct Confederacy's Constitution, 21 PACE L. REV. 395 (Spring 
2001). 
34 See id .  
35 The Lieber Code available a t  http://www.ptialaska.neiJ-swampy/powers/ 
mart-law.html#sec3. 
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The Lieber code forbade the execution of POWs not other- 
wise convicted of capital crimes.36 It forbade physical maltreat- 
ment and recognized the right of POWs to adequate 
nourishment and shelter.37 Following customary law, it pro- 
vides for the death penalty for spies, traitors and criminals 
seeking to benefit from the disturbed state brought by war.38 
While Union practice never followed the letter of the code and 
abuses occurred, to a large degree the Lieber Code, which was 
thoroughly disseminated and largely enforced, insured that the 
captives of the federal army stood a better chance of humane 
treatment than had been accorded prisoners in many prior Eu- 
ropean wars.S9 
The twentieth century saw the greatest expansion of inter- 
national law through treaty, compact and domestic legislation 
in history. The laws of war were revised, recodified and ex- 
panded.40 World War I showed the need to bring controls on to 
the practice of law and the technology spawned to wage war. 
Postwar conferences such as the Washington and London naval 
conferences sought, ultimately with devastating results for the 
Western democracies, to  cap naval expansionism. The issue of 
POWs was, however, a major concern. 
Whether arrived at Geneva or The Hague, both promi- 
nent localities for the negotiation of international compacts 
addressing warfare, the issue of treatment of POWs was cen- 
tral to a number of conferences. In 1929, the United States 
entered into the "Convention Between the United States 
of America and Other Powers, Relating to Prisoner of 
36 See id. arts. 48-80. 
37 See id. art.  76. 
38 See id. art. 83. 
39 The Confederacy never adopted, the Lieber Code but its practices, a t  least 
in the field and during the first two years or so of the conflict largely mirrored 
federal practice. MACKINLAY KANTOR, ANDERSONVILLE (1993) effectively captures 
the horror of the Confederate camp for federal POWs in Georgia but the situation 
in the North was often about the same. A glaring and often unremarked upon 
departure by Confederate military authorities from general principles of treating 
POWs was the systematic brutalization and even cold-blooded murder of captured 
black soldiers. 
40 This essay is limited to issues involving POWs but the Yale Avalon Project 
offers an enormous quantity of documents on the laws of war from the eighteenth 
century on. I t  is an unsurpassed Web-based resource. The Avalon Project a t  the 
Yale Law School, 20th Century Documents at http://www.yale.eduJlawweb/avalon/ 
20th.htm. 
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War."41 The gravaman of the Geneva Convention, ratified by 
many nations (but not, to their awful eventual detriment, by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)42 was that all POWs were 
entitled to safety from hostile or friendly fire,43 removal from 
the immediate area of combat as expeditiously as possible44 and 
protection from arbitrary execution, inhumane treatment and 
inadequate food and ~he l t e r .~5  Reflecting the warrior code that 
the politicians accepted from their military advisors, the Ge- 
neva Convention also provided that POWs could wear decora- 
tions and prescribed when officers of the custodial power had to 
be saluted. The signers vowed that it  "will be the duty of every 
Power to diminish, so far as possible the unavoidable rigors 
thereof and to mitigate the fate of prisoners of war."46 
Most critically, the definition of a person entitled to POW 
status was framed based on the realities and nature of warfare 
as it  was then known. Indeed, the Geneva Convention virtually 
accepts, without commentary, the assumption that a prisoner of 
war is a recognized formal member of his nation's armed 
forces.47 Of relevance today and often overlooked, the Geneva 
Convention of 1929 and subsequent amendm-ents and other 
compacts specifically recognize that POWs may be punished for 
crimes committed prior to capture or after. According POW sta- 
tus to any detainee cannot be a defense against prosecution for 
crimes committed whether in furtherance of military orders or 
as part of what is denominated as a terrorist organization. 
41 Convention Between the United States of America and other Powers Relat- 
ing to Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021 (1932), revised in Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 
3316, TIAS No. 3364, 75 UNTS 135. 
42 Hitler used the absence of the U.S.S.R. as  a signatory as  part of his basis 
for ordering that Soviet prisoners be treated in any manner expedient, specifically 
directing that no act that would constitute a war crime when committed against a 
Geneva Convention signatory would be so regarded when committed against a 
Russian. Hitler's order also specifically authorized the summary execution of any 
Russian deemed dangerous with only an  officer required to pass sentence. In prac- 
tice no such authorization was sought nor could it  be for the mass murders com- 
mitted by the Germans. 
43 Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. 
44 Id. art. 19. 
45 Id. arts. 25-28. 
46 Id. a t  preamble. 
47 The drafters and signers of the Geneva Convention never envisioned female 
combatants but they did require signatories to respect women. Article 3 provides 
that 'Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex." 
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While there are procedural safeguards with reference to imposi- 
tion of the death penalty, its availability is granted for serious 
~rirnes.~8 
Generally, U.S. forces observed the Geneva Convention 
provisions during the Second World War (in any event, much of 
the convention language tracked that of the Lieber Code, which 
in American military law was in effect continuously from the 
Civil WarL49 American observance of the Geneva Convention 
and related legal protection for POWs continued throughout the 
Korean War (where, as previously noted, such adherence to law 
was not reciprocated by either the North Koreans or their Chi- 
nese ally). 
The long and costly Vietnam conflict produced a series of 
challenges regarding protection of POWs by U.S. forces. For the 
first time in a major war, a significant part of a presumably ci- 
vilian population engaged in warfare that could not be dis- 
missed under the older legal rubric of partisan activities.S0 
What had fundamentally changed was the mode of warfare. 
Belligerents largely without motorized vehicles, tanks and 
heavy artillery and with no air assets adapted to fighting a su- 
perpower through guerilla warfare in league with a conven- 
tional armed force, the North Vietnamese Army.5l 
The U.S. largely skirted the issue of defining POW status 
by turning over to Army of Viet Nam units most of the captured 
personnel. That such persons were often abused or even killed 
rekindled debate about treatment of prisoners in the context of 
an increasingly questioned and unpopular armed c0nflict.5~ 
That such persons were not infrequently female and sometimes 
48 Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 100. 
49 Adherence to the Geneva Code was far greater in Europe than in the Pa- 
cific, but far fewer prisoners were taken from Japanese forces. When they were 
taken, it was often within the confines of a small and volatile combat zone where 
violations of rights were, a t  the least, understandable if not excusable. In any 
event the inescapable reality is that the Pacific war had major racial overtones, a 
factor not without pressing comparison with regard to the current domestic and 
foreign U.S. war on terrorism. 
50 This is a position I have heard stated a number of times. 
51 The parallel to the continuing and dangerous Israel/Palestine conflict is 
obvious. 
52 Paradoxically, one of the most inflammatory photos of the war, the single 
shot to the head execution of a North Vietnamese officer in civilian clothes by GEN 
Loan was in substance, if not in nuanced procedure, lawful under the Laws of War 
(including the Geneva Convention). 
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even children complicated the matter greatly.53 What was clear 
was that in a major military operation consuming vast assets 
and continuing for years, the line between the traditionally de- 
fined soldier and other parties engaging in combat had been 
blurred beyond previous wars in numbers, scope and impor- 
tance. There was no justification for the My Lai massacre, but 
it happened for no better reason than the depraved whim of a 
junior officer. 
My Lai and other incidents, occurring at a time when the 
American military was assailed from many quarters of our soci- 
ety (to say nothing of foreign criticism), forced the services to 
reexamine not whether sufficiently detailed law existed to pro- 
tect POWs but whether the troops on the line understood their 
responsibilities and were committed to obeying the law.54 Ini- 
tial inquiries did not return reassuring answers. At least a t  the 
level of the uniformed services, especially the Army and the 
Marine Corps, those most likely to take prisoners, indoctrina- 
tion regarding protection of POWs was intensified and account- 
ability stressed and where necessary enforced by a career- 
ending process. Instruction in the rights of POWs and the corre- 
sponding duties of American military personnel became an inte- 
gral and frequently reviewed aspect of training, especially in 
overseas deployments where encounters with a hostile force 
was either likely or insured.55 
53 See generally SEYMOUR HERSH, MY LAI 4: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE AND 
ITS AFTERMATH (1970); SEYMOUR HERSH, COVER-UP: THE ARMY'S SECRET INVESTIGA- 
TION OF THE MASSACRE AT MY LAI 4 (1973). 
54 Recently, I asked the students in the three classes I teach if they knew of 
the My Lai massacre. With class attendances at 19, 22, and 65, only 0, 1 and 6 ,  
respectively, indicated that they had ever heard of the massacre. Now out-of-print, 
Seymour Hersh's two books, following his groundbreaking revelations about the 
Army murder of women, children and male noncombatants remain essential read- 
ing. Much has happened in the American military since the Vietnam War to not 
only reduce the chance that a junior officer will order a massacre with soldiers 
responding to his commands but that the cover-up which tarnished the Army is 
unlikely to be repeated. I hope. 
55 I am a member of the Navy League of the United States and at  a recent 
meeting a Marine officer sitting with me at dinner pulled a wallet card issued to 
every Marine which said, among other things, that Marines don't kill prisoners. 
Training in protecting prisoners has been reduced to that level of simplicity and 
ubiquity. 
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First, the quick answer every law student wishes would 
precede discussion of difficult material. Without ignoring the 
very real differences between members of Taliban forces and 
members of or detained supporters of A1 Qaeda, an interna- 
tional organization having no known formal relationship to any 
government, I believe all such detainees should be accorded 
Prisoner of War status under the Geneva Convention and rele- 
vant United States law. Doing so represents not a rejection of 
existing law but a relevant and imperative growth of principled 
American recognition of post-modern values, whether well- 
formed or emergent. 
For the purposes of this essay, a member of the Taliban is, 
or more accurately was, part of the armed forces of a nation 
state, that nation being Afghanistan. That the Taliban did not, 
or could not, clothe its ground force with the traditional appur- 
tenances of military service ought to be of no concern. Its forces 
were at the least rudimentarily organized in military fashion, 
had a rank structure, received varying but recognizable degrees 
of military training and were empowered by a government-in- 
being to exercise duties compatible with those of a historically 
denominated national military force. Obviously not the least of 
such responsibilities was defense of Afghanistan against foreign 
troops. The arguments against treating captured Taliban 
soldiers as other than persons entitled to Geneva Convention 
protection are weak, to put it mildly. 
The A1 Qaeda detainees are different in significant ways 
but not to the extent that they should not be treated as POWs. 
They are different in that they belong to an organization be- 
longing, formally, to no country and they act on behalf of, 
openly, no government. To the extent that such persons are 
caught committing or planning criminal acts in any country, 
they can be and should be subject to  that country's laws as ac- 
cused criminals. The story is different when they engage in or- 
ganized combat against an opposing force under circumstances 
that reflect the reality that combat is being waged by U.S. mili- 
tary assets outside this country. That such detainees were cap- 
tured or that they surrendered along with Taliban troops 
strengthens the assumption that they were engaged in military 
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operations.56 Of course the feelings run much higher in the 
U.S. (and elsewhere) against A1 Qaeda members than against 
the captured remnants of the wrecked Taliban regime. 
As of the date of this writing, the Bush administration con- 
tinues to waver over the issue of according Geneva Convention 
protection for the detainees, the majority whom are now at  the 
Guantanamo Navy Base in Cuba. In an administration unusu- 
ally free of reports of internal dissent, only Secretary of State 
Powell has clearly and publicly indicated his preference to 
clothe the detainees with Geneva Convention protections 
(which does not, automatically, require application of the Pris- 
oner of War label but the association would be unavoidable if 
the protections were extended). While it is clear that the Ad- 
ministration agrees that due process in some form is both man- 
dated and accepted, the lines of procedure to  be followed remain 
hazy.67 
While support for extending Geneva Convention protec- 
tions to some of the detainees appears to be taking hold in the 
Bush administration it may well be for the wrong reasons. The 
realistic question as to  how American military personnel might 
be treated if we fail to apply international law protections had 
dominated the discussion and may have dictated a resolution. 
Given the organizations and individuals arrayed against this 
country and their ideological, theologically-driven agendas it is 
not likely that reciprocity with regard to treatment of captured 
56 A historical precedent is not without relevance. In World War 11, the Ger- 
man Schutzstaffel, more commonly known as the SS, was divided into two general 
groupings. One was the separate combat units, the Waffen-SS, which was organ- 
ized into traditional combat formations, was fully integrated into the German Or- 
der of Battle and which waged war. That members of such units often committed 
atrocities is besides the point as such persons were h l ly  amenable to prosecution. 
Members of such units were, when captured, always legally entitled to POW sta- 
tus. By contrast those members of the SS assigned to various duties the most hei- 
nous of which was running concentration camps were never accorded POW status 
but were treated a s  members of a criminal organization (as were members, for 
example, of the Gestapo). Distinguishing between the two elements was done in 
World War I1 despite the heady emotionalism associated with anything bearing 
the title of "SS." 
57 One reason for the murky picture is that while prisoners of war who have 
allegedly committed crimes have, in the past, possessed little or no potential value 
as  informants the case is quite different here. The contradictory stresses induced 
by dealing with enemies who may be chargeable with capital offenses but  who may 
possess information of value to the United States are real. 
Heinonline - -  14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 149 2002 
150 PACE INT'L L. REV. Wol. 14:133 
personnel is an important consideration in their thinking, or 
any consideration a t  all.58 
The real argument for according Geneva Convention pro- 
tections for Taliban and A1 Qaeda prisoners is the recognition 
that America's role in the post-modern world requires our un- 
derstanding of strongly held views about the role of humane 
treatment of captives in warfare, irrespective of the foe's devo- 
tion to such principles. A large segment of the First World has 
turned away from capital punishment; the U.S. has not as a na- 
tion. A large segment of the First World is strongly committed 
to employing legal stratagems against terrorism before embrac- 
ing military solutions to an extent the United States has not. 
Bellicosity, especially of the unilateral American type, disturbs 
much of post-modern Europe. President Bush's exclamation 
that he wants Osama bin Laden "dead or alive" played very well 
domestically. It was a chilling and unacceptable statement 
from our nation's leader for much of the world. 
Conditioned by media exposure to the nature of modern 
military operations and seduced by the often false promise of 
precision attacks with "smart" weapons, many Americans and 
citizens of other countries have gravitated profoundly to a new 
and possibly unrealistic but compelling model of warfare as a 
highly limited, generally brief, surgically precise, limited de- 
struction, few casualties event. Arguments exist to  refute such 
beliefs, but the reality is that in the war against terroristic ac- 
tivities for which no final victory is remotely foreseeable, bal- 
ancing American interests against the concerns of those needed 
as allies is absolutely vital. National security interests cannot 
be surrendered and neither can American sovereignty where it 
validly exists. What is essential is accommodating values that 
are reflective of a fundamental shift in the politics and views of 
post-modern nations. Those nations still moving through the 
various stages of modernity have their own problems. 
The issue of the detainees is a prime example where with- 
out any loss of strategic goals a principled adherence to cloaking 
58 Another historical example is the attitude of the Japanese in World War I1 
toward captured Caucasian prisoners. Since they had zero regard for their own 
personnel who had been captured, how they were treated played no role in  the way 
Allied prisoners were regarded. There is a strong parallel with current religion- 
affiliated groups employing both terrorism and military operations. 
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our Guantanamo detainees (and others sure to follow) with the 
Geneva Convention protections solidifies international support 
for an effort in which this country is the acknowledged leader 
and would be an adoption of international law principles in- 
creasingly regarded as fundamental by the majority of devel- 
oped countries. It would be a win-win position for the United 
States. 
Heinonline - -  14 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 151 2002 
